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Abstract: 
 
This paper focuses on two sets of impacts of public provision of private goods that have been 
neglected in the self-selection framework of optimal taxation, the by-now standard approach 
in examining public provision. We first show, using a general formulation whereby 
production depends on labour supply of different households and the level of public provision, 
that there can be a role for public provision because of productivity and wage-structure 
effects, even if preferences are weakly separable between goods and leisure. Second, we deal 
with a specific example of public provision of education that provides an intuitively appealing 
case for the production side impacts. Finally, we address the role of public provision in a 
dynamic, overlapping generations, economy, whereby public provision may affect efficiency 
and social costs of redistribution of future generations as well, opening up a way to combine 
inter- and intra-generational impacts of public provision. 
 
 
Keywords: Optimal taxation, public provision, education, overlapping generations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the key interest areas in the recent economic research following the asymmetric 
information approach to optimal redistribution has been the attempt to explain the role of 
public provision of private goods (such as education, health care, day care and care of the 
elderly) as a part of redistributive set of instruments (see e.g. Blomquist and Christiansen 
(1995), (1998a) and (1998b), Boadway and Marchand (1995) and Boadway, Marchand and 
Sato (1998))1. All these studies model the production side in a simple way with exogenous 
wage rates for different types of households in a static setting.  
 
The aim of this paper is to extend the literature above in two main ways. First, we allow for a 
richer description of the production technology that enables the before-tax wage rate to 
depend on the labour supply of different households and, in various ways, the level of publicly 
provided private goods. We find this to be a quite important extension because many of the 
publicly provided goods (e.g. education) can have sizeable influence on the productivity of 
different households. It seems to us that in practice the government involvement in public 
provision is indeed often motivated by the attempt to reduce wage inequality. Allowing for 
endogenously determined wages is also interesting because it gives rise to new forms of 
distorting taxation and production inefficiency, along the lines of the important recent 
contribution by Naito (1999).  
 
Second, building on our earlier work (Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001)), we consider public 
provision of private goods in a genuinely dynamic, overlapping generations economy. Many 
of the publicly provided goods have arguably interesting dynamic and cross-generational 
effects, because of financing arising from a different generation (pensions) or potential 
externality effects between generations (education). The government may be interested in the 
provision of such goods precisely because they have a special characteristic to enhance human 
capital. Part of the effects of the publicly provided good can thus be modelled as a stock that 
preserves from period to another and provides a potentially intriguing link between the 
                                                 
1
 For an excellent overview of this literature, see Balestrino (1999). 
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taxation of different households. In such a case, the decision rule for the publicly provided 
private good involves efficiency and distributional considerations both within and between 
generations.  
 
We apply the self-selection approach to optimal non-linear taxation, along the lines of e.g. 
Stiglitz (1982), with two types of households that differ in their income earning abilities. The 
government cannot observe productivity and must design its redistributive policy subject to 
the self-selection constraint that the skilled households do not want to mimic the choice of the 
unskilled households. In addition to the non-linear income tax, the government can provide 
part of a private good to the households.2 The households may supplement this good from 
private markets. The publicly provided good is modelled in a versatile way, affecting 
potentially both household utility, their own income earning abilities and, through an 
externality, the productivity of the entire economy. Thus, we address in principle a large set of 
publicly provided private goods. Throughout the analysis we discuss, however, the findings in 
the education context.  
 
In the first part of the analysis (section 2), we examine a simple static set up but with the 
endogenous wage structure discussed above. We show that in contrast to results in earlier 
literature, there can be reasons for public provision of private goods, even if we assume 
weakly separable preferences between goods and leisure. The reason is that public provision 
can affect productivities of different kinds of labour, thus affecting wage dispersion, and the 
possibilities for redistribution. This result bears resemblance to that of Naito (1999) who 
shows that under similar circumstances, differentiated commodity taxation can be welfare 
improving. In section 3 we consider an example whereby the public provision itself influences 
productivity – i.e. education that raises income-earning abilities – and discuss the 
characteristics of optimal public provision in those circumstances. 
                                                 
2
 An alternative formulation, based on the idea that government may support the consumption 
of a good through price subsidies instead of public provision, would be possible as well. 
However, the recent papers by Blomquist and Christiansen  (1998b) and Boadway, Marchand 
and Sato (1998) have shown that, even when  optimal commodity taxation is allowed for, the 
use of public provision can still be welfare-improwing. 
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In section 4 we extend the analysis into a dynamic, infinite horizon, OLG framework, where 
the individuals live two periods, supplying labour at the first and retiring at the second. The 
purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the extension of the production side of the 
economy to include a stock of publicly provided private good that preserves from period to 
another can affect the public provision rule. In particular, the publicly provided private good 
may be motivated both because of intragenerational and intergenerational reasons. 
Conclusions are given in section 5. 
 
2. Public provision with productivity and  relative wage effects: A 
general case 
 
In this section we consider a simple static formulation of public provision, inspired by e.g. 
Boadway and Marchand (1995). There are two types of households in the economy: 
Households of type 1 are less skilled and earn income 1w . The more skilled household, type 2, 
earns a wage )( 12 ww > . The number of households of each type is 1. Households supply 
labour, denoted by l, and consume two types of goods: a normal private good, c, and a quasi-
private3 good z. The overall level of the latter good for the household is a sum of the public 
provision of the good, depicted by g, and the private, topping up, part, z. We apply the 
terminology introduced by Boadway and Marchand (1995) and call the situation where an 
increase in g leads to a reduction in the private purchases z as one where the household’s 
private purchases of the quasi-private good are crowded out. The government supplies the 
same amount of g to all households. In addition we assume that g cannot be resold.  
 
It is useful to break the household optimisation into two parts. In the first, the households 
make the optimal consumption decision for a given after-tax income (x) and public provision. 
Denote household utility function by ),,( gzlcu iii + , where the subscript )2,1(⊆i  refers to 
household type and is dropped below. Then, using the household budget constraint, the 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘quasi private’ only refers to the idea that this good is both provided by the 
government and purchased by the household itself. 
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household maximisation of ),,( gzlzxu +−  with respect to z yields the following Kuhn-
Tucker conditions: 
 0)(;0 =+−≤+− zczc uuzuu , (1) 
where subscripts refer to partial derivatives.4 Conditions in (1) give the conditional indirect 
utility function [ ]gglxzlglxzxuglxv +−= ),,(,),,,(),,(  and conditional demand for z, 
),,( glxz . Using the envelope theorem, the following properties hold:  
 zgllcx uvuvuv === ,, . (2) 
In the second step of consumer optimisation, the household maximises ),,( glxv  with respect 
to his labour supply, subject to a given tax schedule, T(y), and the budget constraint 
)(yTyx −= , where wly =  denotes households gross income. The optimisation enables the 
marginal income tax to be expressed in terms of the utility function: 
 11)()( +==′
c
l
v
v
w
yMTRyT . (3) 
The production side of the economy is modelled using an aggregate, constant returns to scale, 
production function ),,( 21 ellF , where e denotes the aggregate level of the quasi-private good 
in the economy, i.e. the sum of private and public parts for the two consumers. Note that the 
same technology is used to produce both goods. They have thus similar producer prices as 
well. For simplicity, the prices for both goods are normalised to unity. This specification 
captures two important features of the model. First, the wage rates are endogenous in a similar 
way as in Stern (1982) or Stiglitz (1982). In the following, 
2
1
w
w
=Ω  depicts the relative wage 
of the low-skilled type. Assuming competitive labour market, Ω  is a function of 21 / ll  and e, 
),,(
),,(
212
211
2
1
ellF
ellF
w
w
=  . It captures the idea that the relative wage rate of type 1, determined at the 
market, is a decreasing function of 21 / ll . Hence, if the government uses its policy instruments 
                                                 
4
 The derivative zu  refers to the derivative with respect to the third argument in the utility 
function. 
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so that the relative labour supply of type 2 household rises, it carries a redistributive benefit 
through an increase in the relative wage of low-skilled household.5  The second key feature of 
our framework is that the overall level of the publicly provided good is allowed to affect not 
only consumers directly, but also the production side of the economy by influencing the 
productivity and the wage rates in the economy. Thus e has a positive externality feature.  
 
Following the standard idea of Pareto-optimal taxation, the government maximises the utility 
of the less-skilled households subject to the constraint that the skilled household must stay at a 
given utility level. The government redistributes income by taxing income on a non-linear 
scale. It may also use a uniform public provision of g as a policy variable. We apply the 
information-based approach to tax policy by assuming that the government can observe the 
labour income y, but it observes neither the income earning abilities (the wage rates) of the 
households or their consumption allocation decisions (between c and z). Therefore, the 
government must select the tax schedule subject to the self-selection constraint that the skilled 
household has an incentive to work l2 = y2 /w2, report income y2 and consume x2 instead of 
wishing to pretend to be the unskilled household, i.e. mimic, working 121121 lwlwwy Ω== , 
reporting income y1, and consuming x1. The government chooses the optimal tax schedule (or 
labour – after-tax income) bundles to the two different household types subject to the 
constraint that the skilled household be at a given utility level, the self-selection constraint of 
the skilled household, and the resource constraint of the economy. The Lagrangean of the 
government optimisation problem can therefore be written as  
 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]gxxellF
glxvglxv
vglxvglxvLMax
lxlx
2),,(
),,(),,(
),,(),,(
2121
1122
2
2211
,,, 2211
−−−+
Ω−+
−+=
ρ
λ
δ
. (4) 
The first-order conditions for the tax choice are the following: 
 0ˆ: 211 =−− ρλ xx vvx , (5) 
                                                 
5
 See Stiglitz (1982) or Stern (1982) for details. 
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 0ˆ: 11
1
21
1 =+



Ω+
∂
Ω∂
− wl
l
vvl ll ρλ , (6) 
 0)(: 22 =−+ ρλδ xvx , (7) 
 0ˆ)(: 21
2
22
2 =+∂
Ω∂
−+ wl
l
vvl ll ρλλδ , (8) 
where the hat terms refer to the so-called mimickers, i.e. type 2 households when mimicking 
the choice of type 1. Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) show that in this framework, the 
marginal tax rate for the skilled household is negative and the marginal tax rate for the less-
skilled household is positive.6 Given this income tax schedule, we may use the envelope 
theorem to detect the change in the social welfare from an increase in the level of the publicly 
provided good as follows: 
 ρρλλλδ 2ˆˆ)( 12221 −+
Ω
−−++=
dg
edFl
dg
d
vvvv
dg
dL
elggg . (9) 
Rewriting (9) by substituting for ρ  from (5) and (7) yields 
 
dg
edFl
dg
d
vvvvvvv
dg
dL
elgxxgxg ρλλλδ +
Ω
−−+−++−= 1
2222211
ˆ)ˆˆ())(()( . (10) 
The first three terms in (10) restate the Boadway and Marchand (1995) result (their 
proposition 1) that public provision of private good is welfare improving, if the mimicker 
becomes crowded out (i.e. his private purchases, z, fall to zero) while households of type 1 
and type 2 that report their types honestly are not yet crowded out.7 The intuition is that 
pushing g above the point where the private purchases of the mimicker fall to zero makes the 
mimicker worse off, but if households of type 1 and 2 are not crowded out, it increases social 
welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraint (that a type 2 household honestly reporting its 
income must be better off than a mimicker). Boadway and Marchand also note that in the case 
                                                 
6
 This result can be obtained by combining (7) and (8), as well as (6) and (5). 
7
 This may be seen by using the properties in (2) and combining (10) with the households’ 
first-order conditions in (1). 
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where the publicly provided good enters the households’ utility functions, if preferences are 
weakly separable between goods and leisure, the mimicker and a true type-1 representative 
become crowded out at the same point, because of which there is no benefit from having a 
positive provision of the publicly provided good. 
 
Our focus is, however, more in the production side of the economy, and therefore we 
concentrate on the case with separable preferences, implying that the three first terms of (10) 
are zero. With regard to it, the following result emerges: 
PROPOSITION 1: If preferences are weakly separable between goods and leisure, public 
provision of private good is welfare improving if it (a) increases productivity and (b) 
reduces the wage differentials of the households.  
The results can be seen from the last two effects in (10). The direct productivity effect (last 
term in (10)) is usually positive (if it is negative, then it offsets part of the potential benefits 
for households, ie the original Boadway-Marchand part). What is more interesting, however, 
is the link between the publicly provided private good and the wage structure of the economy 
(the term 12ˆ ldg
d
vl
Ω
− λ ). If its provision leads to a relative increase in the wage rate for type 1 
households, then indirect redistribution through public provision will Pareto-improve welfare 
by mitigating the incentive problem of the non-linear income tax system. Intuitively this 
would be a case where the publicly provided good augments the productivity of type 1 labour 
supply more than that of type 2 labour supply. This effect is similar to the impact of labour 
supply on the wage rates, originally analysed by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982). The result is 
also important in that it bears resemblance to the interesting recent findings by Naito (1999) 
that if wage rates are endogenous, redistribution devices that otherwise would not be applied – 
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in Naito’s case public inputs and commodity taxation and in our case public provision of 
private goods – become welfare-improving. 
 
3. Publicly provided education 
 
In this section we focus on public provision of education8. Similarly to the previous section, 
the household may supplement publicly provided education from the private markets. The 
household optimisation now changes somewhat from the general case (presented above), and 
therefore we explain it in this section again.9 The household utility now depends only on 
private consumption, c, and labour, l.  Education itself does not enter the utility function; it 
affects household wages through its influence on productivity. Let us denote the wage rate for 
household i as ),,( 21 ii ellωω = , where gze ii += . The utility function is now 



−=
ω
y
zxulcu ,),( . The first-order conditions with respect to z are now: 
 0)(;0)( 22 =



−−≤−−
ω
ω
ω
ω e
lc
e
lc yuuzyuu , (11) 
                                                 
8
  In public economics there is quite a large literature on optimal provision of education , 
beginning with Arrow’s (1971) paper. The interaction of optimal income taxation and 
educational choices has been examined among others by Ulph (1977), Hare and Ulph (1979)) 
and Tuomala (1986). Following Arrow the first two papers assume that  ability to benefit from 
education is observed by the education authorities. However, this information is not available 
to the tax officials. The most recent literature on public provision departs from early 
contribution by assuming that public provision cannot be related to an individual’s ability. 
Tuomala (1986) in turn focuses on the question of how educational choices affect the 
progressivity of the optimal income tax. 
9
 The modelling of the household optimisation of this section is based on the framework in 
Boadway and Marchand (1995). 
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where 
e
e ∂
∂
=
ω
ω . Now, the following properties hold for the conditional indirect utility 
function ),,( glxv :  
 2)(,, ω
ω
e
lgllcx yuvuvuv −=== . (12) 
The second step of consumer optimisation gives a marginal tax rate condition similar to the 
one given in (3) in the set-up in the section above. Another change is that the production 
function now depends not only on the labour supply of the households, but also on the level of 
their education. To simplify the production function somewhat, we assume that it takes a 
specific, two factor, form with education-weighted effective labour supplies of both household 
types. The production function may then be written as ),( 2211 leleF . This also means that 
2
1
ω
ω
=Ω  depends on g.  
  
Since the government optimisation remains the same as in the previous section, the optimality 
conditions with respect to the tax rates are also the same. Given the optimal tax schedule, the 
change in the social welfare with respect to public provision of education is  
 
ρλρλλδ 2ˆˆ)( 12
2
2
2
1
1
1
221
−
Ω
−



++−++= l
dg
d
v
dg
edlF
dg
edlFvvv
dg
dL
lggg . (13) 
Rewriting (13) by substituting for ρ  from (5) and (7) yields 
 1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
222211
ˆ)ˆˆ())(()( l
dg
d
v
dg
edlF
dg
edlFvvvvvv
dg
dL
lgxxgxg
Ω
−



++−+−++−= λρλλδ . (14) 
Boadway and Marchand show that without endogenous wages, public provision of education 
is welfare improving, if mimicker becomes crowded out before the true-type households. This 
effect can be seen from the first three terms in expression (14). In our case, where the 
production function is more general, there are also additional impacts. The following 
proposition summarises the effects: 
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PROPOSITION 2: Public provision of education tends to be welfare improving if it (a) 
renders mimicker to be crowded-out first, (b) increases productivity and (c) reduces the 
wage differentials of the households.  
As discussed above, part (a) has already been shown by Boadway and Marchand (1995). Part 
(b) is due to the fourth term in (14) and measures the value of additional production arising 
from an increase in publicly provided education. Unlike in Proposition 1, the productivity 
effect is unambiguously non-negative, and positive, if private education purchases are not 
crowded out. Part (c) is due to the last term in expression (14), with a similar interpretation 
than before: if publicly provided education reduces wage differentials, its provision becomes 
welfare improving, other things being equal.  
 
Boadway and Marchand also show that if the mimicker becomes crowded out at the same 
point as the true-type households, there is nothing to be gained from the public provision of 
education. More precisely, this is the case if the elasticity of the wage rate towards education 
is similar for the mimicker and true type 1 representative. The similar result holds in our 
framework as well: if also type 1 and type 2 households become crowded out, the fourth term 
in (14) vanishes. In addition, with an equal elasticity of the wage rate towards education, 
additional education raises the wage rates of both types in a similar manner, and therefore no 
impacts arise from the fifth term in (14). Note that when the additional impacts we introduce 
refer to the production side, from where the potential effects in the original framework also 
come from, the separability issue highlighted in Proposition 1 does not change the role of 
public provision in the framework of this section.  
 
4. Public provision in an OLG framework 
 
In this section, we extend the previous analysis to a dynamic, overlapping generations, setting 
to address the intergenerational effects of public provision. These are clearly essential in 
public provision of pensions, for example. However, important implications also arise in the 
context of education: public provision of education not only affects efficiency of redistribution 
within one cohort, it can also have lasting effects because of accumulation of knowledge in 
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the economy. These impacts are of key interests in this section that focuses on the role of 
education in an OLG framework10. 
 
We consider an economy where individual households live two periods, acquiring education 
and supplying labour at the first and consuming at the second period.11 We assume for 
simplicity that there is no population growth. Each generation consists of two households that 
have different productivity at the labour market. We apply the following notation: ci
t
 denotes 
the consumption of a household of type i born at time t, xi
t
 the after-tax income of the same 
household, li
t
 household i’s labour supply, tiz  refers to the private purchases of education, and 
r is the interest rate. The household’s utility function is thus ),( tt lcuu = and the combined 
budget constraint tt
t
t xc
r
z =
+
+
+11
1
. As above, the household wage rate depends, among 
other things, on its labour supply and the aggregate level of its education (sum of public and 
private purchases). As before, in the first stage of household optimisation, the household 
chooses the level of education for a given labour supply. Maximisation of 




−+= + t
t
tt
t
tt yzxrulcu
ω
),)(1(),( 1  produces the first-order conditions 
 0)()1(;0)()1( 2121 =



−+−≤−+− ++
ω
ω
ω
ω e
lct
e
lct yuurzyuur , (15) 
where 
e
e ∂
∂
=
ω
ω . Now, the following properties hold for the conditional indirect utility 
function ),,( glxv :  
 21 )(,,)1( ω
ω
e
lgllctx yuvuvurv −==+= + . (16) 
                                                 
10
 For an early contribution in the intertemporal context, see Hare and Ulph (1981). The 
crucial element in their model is imperfect capital markets.  
11
 This section builds on the framework developed by Brett (1997) and Pirttilä and Tuomala 
(2001). We have dropped the first period consumption in order to keep the framework as 
similar as possible to the previous sections. 
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The second step of consumer optimisation gives a condition for the marginal tax rate similar 
to (3) in the first section.  
  
The production side of the economy utilises three factors: capital denoted by k t and the two 
kinds of effective labour. In addition, the productivity of the economy depends on the 
cumulated level of education (or human capital) te  in the economy. Hence, we write the 
production function as ),,,( 2211 tttttt elelekFF = . The production function is assumed to exhibit 
constant returns to scale with respect to labour and capital under perfect competition. Factor 
prices are then determined by the marginal productivities as follows: F rk
t t
= , 
tt
lF 11 ω=  and 
tt
lF 22 ω= . The relative wage between the two types is again denoted by t
t
t
2
1
ω
ω
=Ω . 
 
The government’s problem is to maximise intertemporal social welfare that includes welfare 
comparison both within and between generations. We continue to assume that within 
generation, the government maximises the utility of type 1 household subject to a given utility 
to type 2 household. Across the generations the government is assumed to be utilitarian, but 
the utilities of future cohorts are discounted with a discount factor tβ . As above the 
government chooses the optimal tax schedules and the optimal level of public provision of 
education for each generation, subject to the self-selection constraint of the skilled 
household.12 
 
Finally, we need equations that determine the path of human capital and physical capital in the 
economy. The key underlying idea in this section is that the publicly provided good has 
potential durable impacts over generations. This is modelled here by assuming that the 
productivities of different generations are linked via the term te . Therefore, human capital at 
time t is given by  
                                                 
12
 An additional policy instrument would be a tax levied on savings (or second period 
consumption). Its usefulness as a policy instrument in OLG framework has been addressed in 
e.g. Brett (1997) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001). 
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 ∑ ++= −
i
tt
i
tt gzee )(1α , (17) 
i.e., it is a sum of the human capital at the previous period (weighted with parameter α ) plus 
the increase of education (private and public) at period t. The idea is that future generations 
can utilise the knowledge accumulated by the previous generations. 
  
The evolution of physical capital is determined by the resource constraint of the economy and 
may be written as 
 
ttttttttttttt gcczzkelelekFk 2),,,( 12112122111 −−−−−+= −−+ . (18) 
Note that the production at each period must finance consumption of those that are old and the 
education expenses of the young at that period. 
 
If we ignore the generation that is old at period 1,13 and write the resource constraint in terms 
of observables using the household budget constraint, we are in a position to write the 
Lagrangean for the government optimisation problem as follows:  
 
[ ]
[ ]
∑ ∑
∑
∑
∑ ∑
∞
=
−
∞
=
+−−
+
∞
=
∞
=
∞
=



−+++



−−−−+
+
+−−++
Ω−+
−+=
1
1
1
11
2
1
1
21
1
21
2211
1
1122
1 1
22211
)(
2)(
1
1),,,(
),,(),,(
),,(),,(
t
ttt
i
i
tt
t
tttt
ttttt
tttttttt
t
tttttttt
t t
ttttttttt
egze
kgcccc
r
xxkelelekF
glxvglxv
vglxvglxvL
αµ
ρ
λ
δβ
(19)   
The development of the stock of the human capital is captured by the last constraint, with the 
multiplier referring to the social marginal value of the stock at period t. An important 
assumption to note is that the government possesses perfect control over the capital stock. As 
                                                 
13
 It is a usual feature of dynamic optimal taxation exercises that it is optimal for the 
government to collect the bulk of the revenue by confiscating the capital stock at the outset. 
We want to abstract from these complications by leaving out the generation 0. For a good 
overview on these issues, see Domeij and Klein (1998). 
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shown by e.g. Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), this implies that only one from the resource 
constraint and government budget constraint need to be taken into account. Because of this, 
together with the observation that the resource constraint may be derived from combining the 
government’s and the households’ budget constraints in the Mirrleesian fashion, the multiplier 
associated with the resource constraint, ρ t , may be interpreted as the shadow price of 
government’s revenue. For a given level of publicly provided education, the first-order 
conditions at an exemplary date t revealing the optimal tax structure are the following: 
 0ˆ)1(: 1,21 =
Ω
−−+ − t
t
t
t
l
ttt
k
tt l
k
vFk
∂
∂λρρ , (20) 
 0ˆ:
,2,11 =−−
tt
x
tt
x
tt vvx ρλβ , (21) 
 0ˆ: 11
1
,2,11 =+


 Ω
+Ω− ttt
t
t
tt
l
tt
l
tt l
l
vvl ωρ
∂
∂λβ , (22) 
 ( ) 0:
,22 =−+
tt
x
ttt vx ρλδ , (23) 
 ( ) 0ˆ: 21
2
,2,22 =+
Ω
−+ ttt
t
t
t
l
tt
l
ttt l
l
vvl ωρ
∂
∂λλδ . (24) 
These conditions yield the optimal marginal income tax rates for the two household types for 
each period. For each generation, these are similar to the tax rules in a static economy.14 Our 
main interest is however on the role of public provision in this framework. The conditions that 
determine the welfare impact of public provision are the following: 
 ( ) 022ˆ 222111,2,2,2,1 ≤+−



++−++= tt
t
tt
t
tttt
g
t
g
tt
g
tt
g
t
dg
delF
dg
delFvvvv
dg
dL µρρλδβ , (25) 
 0ˆ: 11,2 =−++
Ω + ttt
e
tt
t
t
t
l
tt Fl
e
ve µαµρ
∂
∂λ . (26) 
                                                 
14
 See Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) for details. 
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Use (21) and (23) to rewrite equation (25) as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
02
ˆˆ
2
22
1
11
,2,2,2,2,1,1
≤+



++
−+−++−=
t
t
tt
t
ttt
t
g
t
x
tt
x
t
g
ttt
x
t
g
t
dg
delF
dg
delF
vvvvvv
dg
dL
µρ
λλδβ
. (27) 
Define the social marginal benefit of public provision of education within a period t (similar 
to the expression given in (14) within the static framework) as 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
t
e
tt
t
t
t
l
t
t
tt
t
ttt
t
g
t
x
tt
x
t
g
ttt
x
t
g
tt
g
Fl
e
v
dg
delF
dg
delF
vvvvvvSMB
ρ
∂
∂λρ
λλδβ
2ˆ2
ˆˆ
1,2
2
22
1
11
,2,2,2,2,1,1
+
Ω
+



++
−+−++−≡
. (28) 
Combining (28) and (26) enables us to rewrite (27) as  
 αµ 12 ++= ttgSMBdg
dL
. (29) 
To arrive at our final expression for the public provision, lead (29) first by one, then two and 
so on periods and combine the conditions. 15 The next proposition summarises the rule for 
public provision in this setting at time t: 
PROPOSITION 3: Given an optimal income tax scheme, the dynamic version of the 
welfare effects of public provision of education is given by: 
∑∞
=
+++
+
+
++ 



+
Ω
+=
1
1,2ˆ2
τ
τττ
τ
τ
τττ ρ
∂
∂λα tettt
t
t
l
tt
g Fl
e
vSMB
dg
dL
. 
Proposition 3 shows how the social value of public provision is the sum of the present period 
effects, captured by tgSMB , plus all the discounted benefits that accrue to future generations. 
The interpretation of tgSMB  is straightforward, given our knowledge of the previous section. 
The contemporaneous effect of g in the OLG framework contains similar effects than in the 
                                                 
15
 In other words, we simply add the first-order conditions for the public good evaluated at 
different periods together to obtain the present value of an increase in the public good. 
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static case: terms capturing the effect on self-selection (the first line in (28)), and impacts that 
address productivity and wage differences (the first two terms at the second line). There is 
also one additional term (the last term in (28)) that is related to the overall, externality type, 
impact of education. In sum, the within-period impacts of public provision arise both from the 
preference and from the production side.  
 
What is novel in the OLG set-up are the inter-temporal productivity effects that arise from the 
presence of human capital in the model and that are captured by the rest of the terms in 
Proposition 3. The level of education, or human capital, that is obtained at a given period t 
partially preserves to the following periods according to (17). In the subsequent periods, 
therefore, present investments in education affect first, the wage structure (the first term in the 
brackets above) and second, the overall productivity of the economy (the second term in the 
brackets). These impacts are not taken into account by the individuals themselves in their 
educational decisions. Therefore, besides the present period effects given by tgSMB , there can 
be intergenerational reasons for public provision of education.16  
 
If future productivity effects are large enough, public provision can be welfare improving even 
if we consider the case where no impacts arise from the (static) crowding out mechanism. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that some of these impacts may of course partially offset each 
other: there can be trade-offs between within-period impacts and benefits to the future 
generations. Balancing these requires the comparison of the shadow value of public funds 
( tρ ) and the importance of the self-selection constraint ( tλ ) in different periods, because the 
valuation of future benefits depends, among other things, on these terms. 
                                                 
16
 It is interesting to compare the dynamic provision rule of the publicly provided private good 
to the dynamic Samuelson rule of a pure public good, analysed in Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001). 
The key difference is that if a public good is durable, its effects on the utilities of future 
generations must be taken into account directly, whereas the publicly provided private good 
affects directly only the utilities of current generation. The dynamic impacts in the private 
good case arise from the potential production side implications.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
Earlier literature on public provision of private goods in an optimal taxation framework has 
recently addressed the role of public provision as a mechanism to relax the self-selection 
constraint that hinders redistribution. This paper focuses on two sets of impacts that have been 
neglected in this literature, but that can yet be important in practice. These include, first, 
impacts arising from the production side of the economy (that has been before analysed in a 
very simple way). We model the production side in a versatile way, allowing the production 
capabilities to depend on labour supply of different households – because of which wage rates 
are endogenous – and also on the level of the publicly provided good. In these circumstances 
we first show that there can be a role for public provision because of productivity and wage-
structure effects, even if standard separability assumptions of household utility assumptions 
are applied. Second, we deal with a specific example of public provision of education that 
provides an intuitively appealing case for the production side impacts.  
 
In the second part of the analysis, we address another extension of the framework and 
consider the role of public provision in a dynamic, overlapping generations, economy, 
whereby public provision may affect efficiency and social costs of redistribution of future 
generations as well. We believe that in the case of many publicly provided goods, both the 
production side impacts (e.g. education) and intergenerational concerns (e.g. pensions) can be 
sizeable and indeed at the heart of the political decisions of public provision. 
 
There are various important issues that are not developed here but could be interesting to 
examine in further work. Our first framework (whereby public provision affects utility 
directly) could be extended by allowing the private and publicly provided goods to be 
produced using different technology with different intensity of low and high skilled workers. 
Arguments similar to those presented by Naito (1999) might be used to show that public 
provision could be welfare improving if its technology is unskilled-labour intensive, even if 
standard separability assumptions of the utility function applied. In addition, our treatment of 
the dynamic issues of public provision leaves many important issues aside, including 
 21 
examination of pensions in this framework and political economy aspects when looking at 
intergenerational comparisons. 
 22 
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